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Introduction 
 
A new pan-Arab news media station was launched in June 2012, in the midst of the 
political turbulence of the Arab uprisings. The satellite TV station al-Mayadeen saw 
the light from its base in Beirut, with Ghassan bin Jeddo1 as its CEO and front figure. 
Bin Jeddo had left al-Jazeera in April 2011, in frustration over – what he saw as – 
the station’s proactive and supportive coverage of the Arab uprisings in general, and 
of the Syrian one in particular. When bin Jeddo announced plans for launching al-
Mayadeen a few months later, the project was firmly placed within the changing 
Arab political landscape of 2011, right from the very beginning. 
 
Al-Mayadeen was born in a time when the Arab political world and public opinion 
were concerned with young activists who had taken to the streets, and on the other 
hand, the growing influence of Sunni Islamist political movements and militant 
groups. The station entered the media scene with the proclaimed aim to redirect the 
Arab attention back to Palestine, and the struggle against, what the station perceived 
as, Western and Israeli imperialism. Moreover, in contrast to the dominant political 
trends such as overthrowing old (often secular) authoritarian regimes and 
promoting Sunni Islamism, al-Mayadeen visibly supported the continued rule of 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and outspokenly rejected the growing influence of Sunni 
Islamism.  
 
I investigate how al-Mayadeen established a perception of the world as divided into 
an ‘us’ (Self) and ‘them’ (Other) during its first years. This dichotomous division of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ was discursively constructed as a strategy to position itself and 
navigate within the upheaval of the Arab political landscape. I also discuss how this 
worldview facilitated the construction of a threat narrative and ultimately of an 
enemy image. I argue that, al-Mayadeen consciously worked with reconstructing a 
heroic image of the Palestinians while revitalising an old threat narrative of Israel 
by interweaving it with the Islamic State in a process of ‘Othering’. I thus show how 
the station’s broadcasts have constructed an enemy image by interlinking old and 
new threat narratives and by presenting them textually and visually as different 
faces of the same enemy.  
 
I draw on three years of research on al-Mayadeen, in which I have focused on 
broadcasts and conducted ethnographic fieldwork at and around the station (Crone, 
2017). The data were collected from September 2013 and the proceeding three years. 
While watching and analysing the programmes, I was interested in understanding 
the worldview behind al-Mayadeen’s editorial line. Thus, I wanted to capture and 
explore the ideological discourse that was formed and developed through the 
composition of broadcasts; what I have elsewhere referred to as The New Regressive 
 
1 Ghassan bin Jeddo is a well-known media figure in the Arab world. He was a central figure at al-
Jazeera, being with the station almost from its first year. In addition to hosting the popular weekly 
show Hiwar Maftuh [Open dialogue], he also held the position as bureau chief of al-Jazeera first in 
Iran, and later Lebanon. He has long been known for his close ties to Hizbullah and his strong support 
of the resistance against Israeli occupation of Arab land.  
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Left (Crone, 2017, Crone, forthcoming 2020). In order to pursue this objective, I 
followed different cultural and societal programmes, as well as media events2 and 
promotional material. This included – but was not limited to – the coverage of the 
Gaza war in 2014, the Ramadan programme Harrir Aqlak [Free Your Mind] 
broadcast in June and July 2015, and al-Mayadeen’s growing collaboration with the 
pan-Latin American news TV station TeleSUR, including their shared broadcast 
productions. I engage with these three elements in the present article as they each – 
and in different ways – deal with threats. Thus, I turn my attention towards one 
central aspect of The New Regressive Left, namely, how it divides the world into ‘us’ 
(Self) and ‘them’ (Other), and how it employs threat narratives and constructs 
enemy images.  
 
In addition to content analysis of programmes, I draw on interviews, which I 
conducted during four trips to Beirut between 2013 and 2015, with relevant figures 
working at and around al-Mayadeen. I visited the main office building several 
times, sat in on shoots, and conducted interviews with 13 staff members, three 
former staff members, and seven stakeholders. I met some of the interviewees only 
once for an official interview, while I met others on several occasions – often at their 
workplace or at cafés, and sometimes in their private homes. The interviews were 
semi-structured, conducted in either Arabic or English, depending on the 
preferences of the interviewees. The interviews contribute to background knowledge 
and inside perspectives that help broaden the analysis.  
 
Al-Mayadeen had produced large amounts of new material at the time of writing; 
however, this article is based solely on broadcast material from the station’s first 
years on the air. That period constitutes a crucial time for Arab political life in 
general, and the establishment and consolidation of al-Mayadeen in particular.3 
During this period, perceptions about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were up for revision and 
negotiations, just as old enemy images were being challenged, and new ones were 
taking form. The collection of material thus took place while enemy images were 
being constructed. The article therefore contributes to a theoretical discussion about 
how such constructions take place in contemporary mass media.  
 
I briefly sketch out below some overall features of the Arab media landscape that 
facilitate the construction of pan-Arab threat narratives and enemy images beyond 
a narrow nation-state perspective. This is followed by an excursion around al-
Mayadeen. 
 
 
 
 
2 For example, when the station organized and hosted a big public celebration of the former Algerian 
freedom fighter, Jamila Bouhired, in the UNESCO Palace in Beirut in December 2013 (Crone, 2019). 
3 I believe that focusing on the station’s first years of broadcasting (2012–2015) offers unique insight 
into the process of enemy image construction in a crucial time for both al-Mayadeen and the Arab 
world at large. The time limitation, however, also means that, the analysis does not include later 
developments regarding enemy image construction at al-Mayadeen. 
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The Arab media context 
 
The flow of information today is moving faster than ever across borders and popu-
lations, and the fight over public opinion has intensified. This is also true in the Arab 
world; while earlier media were subject to strong state control and censorship, the 
current situation partly undermines former state control with a vast number of 
state-owned and privately-owned satellite media combined with access to the Inter-
net (most importantly, through smart phones). Nation-states only constitute one 
out of several disseminators in the Arab world and beyond. Cross-national identity 
groups, ideological and religious movements, and political alliances are also con-
stantly making their voices heard. The same diverse groups of actors are concur-
rently all potential contributors to productions of threat narratives and enemy im-
ages, just as they are potential objects of other actors’ narratives and images.  
 
A shared language in the Arab world additionally facilitates a regional transnational 
flow of information and communication. This regional media scene developed dur-
ing the late 1990s and early 2000s to such a degree that observers began talking 
about a shared pan-Arab public sphere; not least, the development within pan-Arab 
news production led by al-Jazeera was an important factor in the establishment of 
an Arab public sphere (Lynch, 2006). The Arab public sphere however, not only fa-
cilitates a contemporary news stream, but also collective memories, building on a 
(partly) shared history, culture and political context. The pan-Arab public sphere 
has been altogether an important arena for developing and maintaining threat nar-
ratives, and ultimately for constructing and disseminating enemy images across na-
tional borders – often with Israel starring in the lead role - although other regional 
and international actors have also appeared.  
 
The growing numbers of pan-Arab media ensured a process of pluralisation during 
the first decades; since the uprisings, the Arab media has undergone a process of 
increased fragmentation (Lynch, 2012; Lynch 2015; Lynch et al., 2014). Political and 
ideological disagreements divided the Arab populations after 2011 and disintegrated 
the Arab public into echo chambers. According to Marc Lynch, the current media 
outlets more openly promote political agenda (often of their funders), while viewers 
tend to seek out like-minded sources. Thus, the post-2011 pan-Arab public sphere 
has not only stimulated division but also supported the production of threat narra-
tives. 
 
Al-Jazeera had maintained a special position as the media outlet that could unite 
most viewers across national borders and political beliefs up until 2011 – and in 
spite of the increasing pluralisation of the media landscape – and thus served as a 
shared point of reference in a pan-Arab public sphere (Lynch, 2006). One of the 
reasons that al-Jazeera was able to maintain a position as the pan-Arab media out-
let, was the station’s ability to bring together different voices representing Arab na-
tionalists, Islamists, political liberalists, and leftists (Oifi, 2005, pp. 72–73). Staff 
and viewers united around a common agenda such as criticising Arab authoritarian 
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rule and Western imperialist behaviour, in spite of the different ideological outlooks 
at al-Jazeera, while the Palestinian cause and a general resistance discourse func-
tioned as a shared focal point (Lynch, 2006).  
 
The Arab uprisings, nevertheless, challenged al-Jazeera’s former uniting role. The 
political reality in 2011 divided former allies across the Arab world. This was also 
the case on the editorial board at al-Jazeera and between the station’s audiences. A 
number of journalists and other staff members, including Ghassan bin Jeddo, left 
the station due to disagreements over the editorial line on covering the uprisings, 
and the number of viewers decreased. The proactive coverage of events in Syria for 
example – for some, an important symbol of the last Arab bastion of resistance 
against Israeli occupation and Western dominance – triggered divisions (Cherribi, 
2017; Abdul-Nabi, 2018).4 Al-Jazeera’s editorial line likewise caused the end of its 
collaboration with TeleSUR.5 The two stations had been working together since 
2006, exchanging media products and facilitating news coverage in the two regions 
(Ricco, 2012, pp. 3–5). Disagreements over how to perceive the Arab uprisings when 
they broke out in Syria brought the collaboration to an end (Ricco, 2012). 
 
Three interlocked developments had taken place alongside these changes in the 
Arab media sphere, during the decades leading up to the uprisings.  
Firstly, the centres of Arab media, historically Lebanon and Egypt, had moved to the 
Gulf (partly due to the Lebanese civil war).  
Secondly, the general Islamisation of Arab society, which followed the failure of the 
authoritarian, secular nationalist regime, and the success of the Iranian revolution, 
started to move into the Arab media scene. While the cultural sphere had remained 
strongholds of secular values until the 1990s, the launch of the first Islamic channel 
(the privately-owned Iqraa Channel) in 1998 brought the general Islamisation of 
society on to the media platform (Galal, 2014; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2014). By 2011, 
Arab media had turned into an important arena for encounters between religious 
and secular forces (Nieuwkerk, 2008, Haugbolle, 2013) with Saudi Arabia aiming at 
dominating pan-Arab media (Yaghi, 2017).  
Thirdly, since the Iranian revolution in 1979, Saudi Arabian and Iranian rivalry over 
regional leadership and influence in the Islamic world has been steadily growing, 
and only escalating since the Arab uprisings in 2011. The aspirations of the two 
states are founded on both ideological and geopolitical objectives, while the Sunni-
Shi’a dichotomy is frequently played out to advance political ends (Mabon, 2013, 
Keynoush, 2016). Today, the conflict manifests in different political and military 
forms in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, for example, just as it is reflected in the 
 
4 The Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar is another example of a media outlet that was divided over the 
Syrian conflict; for a discussion of this see: Hanssen and Safieddine (2016): ‘Lebanon’s al-Akhbar 
and Radical Press Culture: Towards an Intellectual History of the Contemporary Arab Left’. 
5 TeleSUR is a pan-regional news station based in the capital of Venezuela. It was launched in 2005 
on initiative of Hugo Chávez and can be seen as an example of Chávez’s strategy to strengthening 
Latin America against US hegemony through collaboration (Hayden 2012, 132; Painter 2008, 45). In 
2012 the station was owned by Venezuela (46%), Argentina (20%), Cuba (14%), Uruguay (10%), 
Bolivia (5%), and Ecuador (5%) (Ricco, 2012, p. 3). In respectively 2016 and 2018, Argentina and 
Ecuador withdrew their funds after elections and change of governments. 
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media landscape where religiously-based rhetoric is used by both sides to delegiti-
mise the other, and gain regional influence (Yaghi, 2017). Al-Mayadeen was born 
within this context of political and media fragmentation. The establishment of al-
Mayadeen, including its political positioning and financial set-up, is the focus of the 
following section. 
 
Al-Mayadeen 
 
A prominent figure at al-Jazeera, programme host and Beirut bureau chief, 
Ghassan bin Jeddo, resigned on 11 April 2011. Bin Jeddo left al-Jazeera accusing 
the station of serving as “an operation room for incitement and mobilisation” (As-
Safir, 2011). His support for the resistance against Israel, and sympathy for Hizbol-
lah was well known; and his frustration with al-Jazeera was connected to its proac-
tive coverage of the Syrian uprising. When al-Mayadeen was launched a year later 
in June 2012 with the telling slogan, Reality as it is [al-waqa’a kamma hua], many 
expected this ‘reality’ to reflect the interests of the Iranian or Syrian states.  
 
From day one, al-Mayadeen has proclaimed its aim is to redirect the focus back to 
Palestine, and the resistance against Israel, arguing that, the past years of Arab up-
risings have led to confusion, lack of direction, and division within the Arab popu-
lations (Al-Hakim, 2012). Al-Mayadeen’s focus on Palestine is accompanied by a 
strong anti-imperialistic rhetoric, which al-Jazeera’s post-2011 editorial prioritisa-
tion had left vacant for others to house. Al-Mayadeen also stands in clear opposition 
to al-Jazeera, not least in regard to its obvious support for the al-Assad rule in Syria, 
the sceptical approach to Sunni Islamism, a noteworthy positive interest in Middle 
Eastern Christian and other religious minorities, and an unusual sympathy for Iran 
(Crone, 2017).  
 
Al-Mayadeen is, moreover, manoeuvring within a sphere where Saudi Arabia as-
pires to consolidate its growing influence – as al-Mayadeen experienced in Novem-
ber 2015 when ArabSat decided to suspend its provision of satellite services to al-
Mayadeen. This was done, following the accusation that, al-Mayadeen had violated 
the spirit of the Honour Charter of the Arab Media.6 The crisis was officially trig-
gered by al-Mayadeen’s hosting of a guest who accused Saudi Arabia of being re-
sponsible for the casualties during Hajj [the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, 
Saudi Arabia] in 2015. The majority of the staff at al-Mayadeen, however, under-
stood the root of the conflict as the station’s critical coverage of Saudi Arabia’s role 
in the war in Yemen (interviews, Beirut, November-December 2015). The incident 
reaffirmed al-Mayadeen’s self-perception of being the oppositional voice, fighting 
 
6 By violating the charter, ArabSat suggested that, al-Mayadeen was guilty of broadcasting 
programmes which “contravene viewers’ rights and privacies, instigate sectarian conflicts, violence, 
differences, social disorder that disturb tranquillity, disunite viewers, or degrade and demean any of 
the political and religious figures in countries of the footprint of the satellite” 
(https://www.arabsat.com/english/media-center/news-press-and-events/corporate/statement-of-
broadcasting-via-arabsat-satellites [accessed January 2020)]. 
Vol.10No.1Spring/Summer 2020  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
7 
 
against the dominance of pro-Western, Sunni-Islamist Saudi Arabia over the Arab 
media landscape. 
 
The official details regarding the station’s ownership and finances remain inacces-
sible. The management of al-Mayadeen has persistently stated that “Arab business-
men”7 fund the project, but there are several indications that Iran is the main – if 
not only – sponsor. The editorial line of the station is conspicuously aligned with the 
interests of Tehran, just as central persons around al-Mayadeen have professional 
or personal connections with either al-Manar, Hizbollah, or the Syrian regime 
(Crone, 2017). The physical location of the headquarters in Hizbollah-dominated 
Southern Beirut, furthermore underlines its political association; placed between 
the Iranian embassy, the Iranian cultural centre and other Iranian-funded media 
outlets such as Iran’s English-speaking satellite station, al-Alam; Hizbollah’s TV 
station, al-Manar; Hamas’s TV station, al-Aqsa, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s TV 
station. The role of Iran cannot be ignored, even though official data about the fi-
nancial setup are lacking. This underscores al-Mayadeen’s positioning in the Ira-
nian-Saudi Arabian power struggle over regional influence.  
 
The Iranian link may be an important element in understanding the station, and 
might be the main motivation of the funder; al-Mayadeen is equally an interesting 
arena for understanding political and cultural negotiations taking place in parts of 
the contemporary Arab public. The composition of broadcasts, the guests invited to 
programmes, the use of music and poetry, and so on, are all elements of al-Maya-
deen’s attempts to present a home-grown, Arab (Levant-based) alternative media 
platform to the mainstream, Gulf-centred, Arab media landscape. Al-Mayadeen be-
comes yet another actor that contributes to the process of Othering by articulating a 
division in a time of political power struggle and escalating violence between an ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ scenario, and not only on a regional level, but also globally.  
 
A brief theoretical framework for threat narratives and enemy images follows, be-
fore I examine how these two concepts are at work at al-Mayadeen. 
 
 
Threat narratives and enemy images – some theoretical perspectives 
 
The study of enemy images was traditionally conducted within the context of the 
Cold War, mainly within social psychology and peace studies. According to Elizaveta 
Gaufman, the security context has changed today: “the theoretical framework of en-
emy images has effectively reached a dead end” (2017, p. 25). This field might, at 
first, seem less topical today; however, when one moves beyond the obvious frame 
established by the Cold War, it becomes clear that, constructions and propagation 
 
7 See for example http://www.beirutreport.com/2013/08/who-owns-al-mayadeen_12.html 
[accessed December 2019] for an interview with al-Mayadeen’s then head of news, Sami Kleib, about 
the funding of al-Mayadeen.  
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of threat narratives and enemy images are as acute as ever; while nation-states ear-
lier constituted the primary actors for the discursive construction and dissemination 
of enemy images, today, this field has become pluralised.  
 
Today, the flow of information – and along that images, narratives, and myths about 
others – is neither limited by national borders, nor fully controlled by national gov-
ernments. A consequence of this contemporary media scene is a growing focus on 
mass as well as online media as less coherent actors or with a “disintegrated nature” 
(Vuorinen, 2012, p. 6). This new arena for discursive negations allows for media 
outlets, political movements, and civil society actors to propagate and engage with 
alternative narratives and images.  
 
The construction of an enemy image often starts with a process of Othering. Other-
ing or ‘Otherness’ is a discursive practise in which an in-group (‘us’) constructs a 
self-identity in opposition to an out-group (‘them’) as the Other. The binary opposi-
tion is reproduced through markers of sameness and differentiation, and is conse-
quently constitutive identity constructions of relational oppositions (Hansen, 2006, 
p. 41). The construction of an out-group is thereby equally a construction of an in-
group, as its identity takes shape while mirroring its own counter-image (Staszak, 
2008, p. 2). The establishment of the Other is not, however, an enemy image per se, 
but an enemy is always understood as an Other. The main difference between an 
Other and an enemy is the element of a threat. If the Other constitutes a threat – 
perceived as real by the Self – it can develop into an enemy (Vuorinen, 2012, pp. 2–
3). An enemy image cannot therefore merely build on feelings of dislike, but must 
involve the risk of violence (Luostarinen, 1989, pp. 125). 
 
The enemy images can refer to an external threat as, for example, another nation-
state or an internal threat as a group that is within society but outside the defining 
‘us’ (the Self), (Gaufman, 2017, p. 5; see also Harle, 2000). This is regardless of the 
external or internal nature of a threat “to be effective an enemy-image must be easily 
recognizable, openly threatening, rationally, or at least pseudo-rationally justifiable, 
and emotionally touching” (Vuorinen, 2012, p. 5). A threat can therefore be under-
stood as a discursive construction, the meaning of which needs to be accepted by a 
relevant audience in order to be perceived as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 30).  
 
While discourses are constantly interacting and evolving, certain understandings 
can be relatively stable when reproduced within existing identity constructions. An 
effective enemy image builds on pre-existing threat narratives in order to resonate 
within a society (Gaufman, 2017, pp. 6, 27; Vuorinen, 2012, p. 5). The latter point 
makes Elizaveta Gaufman argue for the importance of integrating the notion of col-
lective memory in the study of enemy images, as it is the shared information and 
memories held by a group (the ‘us’) that constitutes the precondition of the con-
struction of an enemy image (Gaufman 2017). Bo Petersson even argues that, enemy 
images “develop from the ground prepared in the everyday by these less dramatic, 
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but nevertheless negative stereotypes” and adds that, the difference between the two 
is “in degree, not in kind” (Petersson, 2009, p. 461). 
 
The construction of an enemy image therefore consists of several elements: it starts 
with a process of Othering, demands the existence of an actual or perceived threat, 
and often builds on well-established threat narratives within the collective memory 
of an ‘us’. These constructions are simultaneously (re)produced within – and among 
– media, and political and societal discourses, through references that can be per-
formed both textually and visually. The meaning ascribed to a text or image is 
thereby understood as constituted within complex discursive structures that are 
(re)produced within – and by – the cultural, historical, and political context in which 
they are situated (Warrington & Windfeld, 2020, p. 40). An integrated part of enemy 
images is, moreover, the existence of a victim – the object of the threat (Gaufman, 
2017, p. 22). Bahador argues on a constructional level that “enemy images are 
formed by the use of images, metaphors, frames, narratives, myths, and ideas” 
(2012, p. 196), while dehumanisation, demonisation, and presentation of the “en-
emy-Other as an indistinguishable mass” are central strategies (Steuter and Wills, 
2009, p. 12). 
 
Enemy images are thus understood as discursive constructs on several levels, in-
cluding textual and visual references to a specific Other, as well as broader narra-
tives that can (re)produce a collective memory. These discursive structures of mean-
ing open cognitive realms of opportunities in which identities can be shaped and 
reshaped (Hansen, 2006, pp. 19–20). According to Lina Khatib, political actors in 
the Arab world are increasingly playing with narratives and image construction. She 
argues: “The Middle East has become a site of struggle over the construction of so-
cial and political reality through competing images. In this competition, one political 
actor’s carefully self-constructed image can be erased by a new, oppositional image” 
(Khatib, 2013, p. 2). Political struggles are thus (also) fought as battles of represen-
tation, which make the media sphere a platform for images, narratives, and so on to 
flow, interlink, and develop over time and space. This also means that, mass media 
constitutes both a central arena and a central actor for construction of threat narra-
tives and enemy images.8  
 
The following section is an investigation into the processes of Othering at al-Maya-
deen during the station’s first years. One perspective of this process is closely inter-
linked with the contemporary political context in the Arab world, while another in-
tegrates the media scene and thus places al-Mayadeen within an ‘us and them’ di-
vision. 
 
 
 
 
8 For instance, in regards to war reporting, Rune Ottosen argues that, demonisation is an essential 
element and thus enemy images can be “linked to the journalistic process itself” (Ottosen, 1995, p. 
99). 
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The process of Othering – the construction of ‘Us and Them’ 
 
Born in the midst of political and ideological confrontations, playing out in the 
streets of Arab cities, and in the official political life as well as in the media, ideals of 
objective reporting were never part of al-Mayadeen’s DNA. From its first day of 
broadcasting, it was obvious that al-Mayadeen – like the rest of Arab media outlets 
– was taking part in a political power battle between ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ or in 
the process of discursive Othering. Although the political frontlines were clear, there 
was little agreement, however, about who – or what – constituted ‘the good’ or ‘the 
bad’.  
 
Al-Mayadeen, constructed the regional ‘bad' as the ones who contributed to dividing 
the Arab world by supporting the Arab uprisings – whether siding with the demo-
cratically-minded activists or any of the (Sunni) Islamist movements. ‘The good’, on 
the other hand, were loyal to true Arab interests, symbolised by supporting the re-
sistance against Israel. The Gaza war in 2014 proved an occasion to unfold this mes-
sage. An example was the noticeable serial of promotional visuals of personal greet-
ings to the people of Gaza from well-known Arab cultural figures.9 The initiative 
functioned as a public confirmation of Palestine as the centre of the collective Arab 
attention.  
 
The Lebanese singer Moein Sherif, in his greeting to Gaza, participated in the de-
construction of the narrative of an Arab Spring. He sanctioned the premise that, any 
true ‘Spring’ should originate in Palestine: “The Arab Spring is not an Arab Spring 
if it does not emanate from the basic question, which is the question of Palestine and 
Jerusalem in particular”. Julia Boutrus, another Lebanese singer, backed the dis-
crediting of the Arab uprisings, and confirmed Palestine as the main topic of im-
portance: “They invented something called The Arab Spring in order to distract us 
from the original question, the central question of Palestine. The real Arab Spring 
today is in Gaza”.10 Who ‘they’ or ‘the Other’ is remains unarticulated. The interplay 
between textual and visual references certainly includes Israel, yet leaves the viewer 
with a feeling that ‘the Other’ is probably bigger than that, and thus tapping into 
references to wider discourses on the matter. Through such personal statements, al-
Mayadeen slowly erased an image of the post-2011 Arab world as “a new worldli-
ness” (Dabashi, 2012, p. 10), and reconstructed the former trope of Palestine as the 
axis around which true Arab interests revolve. 
 
A hint about whom this extended Other included had already been communicated 
before the outbreak of the Gaza war. Al-Mayadeen was not only firmly positioned 
in a regional context but had been keen on adding a global outlook from the begin-
ning. This had led to the close collaboration with the pan-Latin American news sta-
 
9 To mention a few: the Palestinian media person Abdel Bari Atwan, the Lebanese singer Julia 
Boutrus, the Palestinian-Egyptian poet Tamim Barghouti, and the Syrian actor Jamal Sulaiman. 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIN2_UOtvNI [accessed January 2020]. 
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tion TeleSUR – but even before this was established, Latin America served as a re-
gion of ideological inspiration and like-minded media. As one central staff member 
at al-Mayadeen explained to me: “historically there are many similar conditions, 
especially with regards to the United States of America’s greed for the wealth of these 
Latin American countries and nations, and Israel’s greed for the nations in the Arab 
region” (interview, Beirut, November 2015). This idea about the two regions being 
united by a shared meeting with imperialistic hegemony – whether in the shape of 
Israel or the U.S. – forms the basis for the collaboration and for al-Mayadeen’s 
global outlook. 
 
A delegation from al-Mayadeen travelled to Cuba in 2013, to take part in the annual 
Radio and Television festival in Havana. Al-Mayadeen covered the event, including 
Ghassan bin Jeddo’s speech to participants in which he articulated the ‘us-them’ 
division, and explained how he saw the contemporary global media scene divided 
into two opposing camps: one that supports Western imperialism and one that re-
mains free, resisting the Western hegemony. He elaborated, addressing the partici-
pants: 
 
You are with the public good and peace; they are with public misery and war. You are with 
media that serve the public good, the poor, the miserable, the intellectuals, the writers, chil-
dren and women, and that defend the land, dignity, independence, and the love for cherished 
honourable life. They use and promote media that serve the public exploitation, corruption, 
the non-nationally-minded bourgeoisie, colonialism, slavery, and the humiliated and dis-
graced life under different titles that impose hegemony on everything and in the name of 
everything. 
 
Bin Jeddo later changed to speaking in the first person, as he placed himself and his 
station within the ‘good’ camp. He said: “We are in fact with freedom, democracy, 
and human rights and we really want and seek and work in order to support the 
interaction between cultures and civilisations and history” (al-Mayadeen in Havana 
2013, 29/07/2013). Who ‘us’ and ‘them’ actually represent again remains unarticu-
lated, but the message of Othering is clear, and the contexts of an imperialist West 
is taking form. According to bin Jeddo, the world is divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’; 
this is manifested historically, politically, and morally, just as it is reflected in the 
media landscape. Al-Mayadeen thus operates with a clear dichotomy that is globally 
applicable, and in which supporting Palestine (in any form or shape) functions as 
the crucial benchmark against which all political actors should be measured in the 
process of Othering.  
 
An in-depth exploration of the empirical material follows, and identifies how this 
established Othering constitutes the basis for the relaunching of the old threat nar-
rative of Israel. 
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Relaunching the pre-existing threat narrative of Israel 
 
Relaunching Palestine at the top of the Arab agenda is equally a relaunching of the 
most well-established threat narrative in the Arab world, namely, that of Israel. 
Throughout the years Palestine – and Israel – has been a reason for wars, a central 
theme for all major regional political movements, a cause used by Arab states for 
self-promotion and self-legitimisation and “the prism of pain through which most 
Arabs view the world” (Telhami, 2013, p. 73). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has 
likewise played an important role in Arab media, not least after the birth of Arab 
satellite TV and particularly in al-Jazeera’s intensive on-the-ground coverage of the 
Second Intifada in 2000 (Elmasry et al., 2013). By 2011, for the first time in nearly 
70 years, this seemed to be changing as other political, ideological, and military con-
frontations came into focus.  
 
When al-Mayadeen relaunched the struggle for Palestine and, together with that, 
the threat narrative of Israel, it was with an integrated ambition about changing the 
perception of both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The focus on Palestine at al-Mayadeen is 
not only reflected in the time allocated to the topic; but also in the way, it is framed. 
There is a conscience ambition about breaking away from the mainstream percep-
tion of the Palestinian people as passive victims, and replacing this with a narrative 
of a proud and heroic people that actively resists with an admirable persistence. A 
central staff member from al-Mayadeen’s Promotional Department explained to 
me: 
 
So, the image of the Palestinian human being […] we are working very seriously on changing 
that stereotype of the Palestinian who is helpless and just crying. Because you can’t, psy-
chologists tell us that you can’t empathise with a person like that. You can only feel empathy 
with a person that knows what he wants. It is like ‘tell me what you want and I will help you 
out, I can’t help you out if you are just sitting there crying all the time. […] So, we do work on 
the bad stereotyped image of the Palestinians (interview, Beirut, November 2014). 
 
The Gaza war in 2014 proved an important occasion for al-Mayadeen to promote 
such an alternative image of the Palestinians. The war was covered intensively, and 
while the results of the Israeli violence were far from downplayed, it was used to 
frame the heroic Palestinian resistance rather than their suffering. Arab cultural 
productions and figures likewise played a central role in the coverage, as a strategy 
to prove the continued existence of a heroic and civilised people. An example of this 
is the Lebanese singer, Julia Boutrus, who played a central role at al-Mayadeen in 
the crucial weeks of the war. She appeared in several contexts, and importantly, she 
released the song “Right Is My Weapon” [al-Ḥaqq Salaḥi], at al-Mayadeen. The song 
illustrates how the renewed heroic image of the Palestinians is accompanied by an 
equally weakened image of the Israelis. The song’s video footage showed Boutrus 
walking around in a beautiful nature setting while singing, is mixed with clips of 
courageous, professional resistance fighters, and rebellious civilians resisting the 
occupation on one hand, and cowardly, surrendering or wounded Israeli soldiers on 
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the other. As Boutrus notes in the song: “They [the Israelis] will leave and we will 
stay, and the land will remain ours”.  
 
The heroic Palestinian image that al-Mayadeen wants to promote is not a new in-
vention; rather, it builds on an old narrative that traces back to the first decades 
after the Nakba (the Catastrophe) in 1948. The image of the resisting Palestinian 
developed as part of the transnational, Third World anti-colonial community of re-
sistance, and was radicalised after the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 (Khalili, 2009, 
pp. 18–20; Matar and Harb, 2013). The international humanitarian and human 
rights discourse, which gained influence during the 1980s and ‘90s, however, chal-
lenged this image of heroic Palestinian resistance. The human rights discourse had 
already been invoked during the First Intifada (1987–1993) as a strategy for inter-
national attention, while the Oslo Accords (1993) and the following influx of foreign-
funded NGOs changed the rules of the game (Hammami, 1995; Allen, 2009). Adapt-
ing to political circumstances, the image of the militant hero appeared to lose its 
appeal, while the innocent victim could win the sympathy of an international audi-
ence.  
 
An important platform for propagating what Samir Kassir referred to as “the cult of 
victim” (Kassir, 2006, p. 81) was the media, and not least pan-Arab satellite TV, 
which, during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), turned the Palestinian into a “sym-
pathy-deserving suffering human” (Allen, 2009, p. 162). Marc Lynch likewise shows 
how a discourse of shared Arab victimhood and societal crisis, promoted especially 
by al-Jazeera, was important for unifying the new Arab public (Lynch, 2006, pp. 11, 
35, 58; see also Kassir, 2006, pp. 81, 85). At al-Mayadeen, this was seen as an ex-
pression of the hegemony of Western narratives within media. A staff member from 
the Promotional Department elaborated: 
 
We think and we believe that it [the perception of the Palestinian person] was manipulated 
on purpose for years and years and decades, because it is more difficult for someone to feel 
[for] a weak person. As I told you, we believe that this was done systematically and on pur-
pose by various media outlets. We believe that, it started in the Western media and it was 
copied – was it by choice or by practice or by being unaware of how dangerous this kind of 
practice is? (interview, Beirut, November 2014). 
 
The threat (to Arab interests and Palestinian justice) is seen in this quotation as 
Western media manipulating the image of the Palestinian to weaken the Palestinian 
and Arab self-esteem, and depoliticise the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Al-Maya-
deen’s aim is to erase – to borrow the words from Lina Khatib: “one political actor’s 
carefully self-constructed image” and replace it with “a new, oppositional image”.  
 
Israel, without comparison, constitutes the most well-established threat narrative in 
the Arab world, but al-Mayadeen’s stated agenda about revitalising the Palestinians 
as heroic and strong, emasculates Israel, and thus weakens the narrative of Israel as 
an intimidating threat. Furthermore, in al-Mayadeen’s first years, Israel was not the 
main threat to safety and everyday life in the Arab world. Armed conflicts in Syria 
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and Iraq were causing large numbers of refugees, as a new and more acute threat 
was taking shape, namely, militant Islamist movements, particularly the Islamic 
State.11 Below, I further investigate how al-Mayadeen renewed and actualised the 
well-known threat narrative about Israel by including these new actors. 
 
 
The construction of a two-faced enemy image 
 
As outlined earlier, two effective elements for the construction of an enemy image 
are in accordance with Gaufman: the presence of a victim and of a (perceived) actual 
threat. The Palestinians no longer filled the part of the victim in al-Mayadeen’s he-
roic Palestinian discourse, just as Israel no longer played the role of the ultimate 
threat. The old threat narrative was transformed into a new enemy image, and was 
shaped at al-Mayadeen in an interplay between ideological beliefs, political agenda 
and developments on the ground. Although Israel continued to remain the well-es-
tablished core, a new actor, the Islamic State, was integrated as another face of the 
same enemy. This is expressed by the Lebanese singer Julia Boutrus in her greeting 
to the people in Gaza in 2014: “And a word to the people of Iraq and Syria who are 
facing the same enemy, but with two different faces, the Zionist enemy of which the 
other face is extremism”. 
 
The two issues – the war in Gaza, and the conflict revolving around the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria – might not seem related at first sight, but, at al-Mayadeen they 
were. While this inter-relation was only implied during the war in 2014 (as illus-
trated by Boutrus’ statement), a year later, when al-Mayadeen marked the one-year 
occasion of the war, it had matured. In August 2015, al-Mayadeen presented a 
threat narrative under the slogan, The Same Confrontation, about Israeli soldiers 
and Islamic State fighters being one and the same enemy. This was constructed by 
images of soldiers divided into two halves – an Israeli and an Islamic State fighter, 
or by short visuals in which an Islamic State fighter was shot, but, by the time he fell 
to the ground, he had turned into a dead Israeli soldier. These images and visuals 
were broadcast in between programmes, on the homepage, and on the station’s Fa-
cebook page.  
 
One telling example of this campaign was the 45-second clip, The same barbarism 
– the same terrorism – the same elimination. It provided a historical perspective to 
the renewed threat narrative, and thoroughly interlinked Israel and the Islamic 
State. The screen is divided into two halves, with each one streaming similar images 
– one side showing the results of Israel’s presence in the region, the other showing 
consequences of the Islamic State. There also appear similar streams of refugees and 
 
11 I fully acknowledge the extent of state violence, which took place simultaneously at that time. To 
this particular analysis, I focus on the threat narrative as produced at al-Mayadeen in which state 
violence in these two countries (Syria and Iraq) did not gain attention. On the contrary, the Syrian 
state was portrayed as combatting the threat rather than being a threat. 
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refugee camps, similar images of death and violence, and similar images of the de-
struction of cultural sites, olives trees, and religious symbols. Some images are old 
and in black and white, others contemporary and in colour. The clip draws heavily 
on Arab collective memories of Israeli violence in the region, as well as central sym-
bols of Arab civilisation and cultural heritage, while the historical threat is interwo-
ven with a new and contemporary one. To spell out the message of one enemy with 
two faces, the flash ends with a photograph of the Israeli President Netanyahu next 
to the then leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the words: The 
same elimination. The flash is visually powerful with strong images, strong slogans, 
and a strong message – about a new, yet well-known enemy.  
 
The Ramadan programme of 2015, Harrir Aqlak [Free Your Mind], is another ex-
ample of how the new enemy image was constructed. In this case, not by strong vis-
uals but through persuasive argumentation in a context of religion – thus feeding 
into the sectarian media confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran (as men-
tioned earlier). The host of the 30 episodes presented during Ramadan, the Kuwaiti 
Islamic thinker Abdel Aziz al-Qattan sharply criticised the Gulf in general, and Sunni 
Islamism in particular. He did so with the legitimacy of being a khaliji [a person 
from the Gulf]. To highlight his Gulf identity (and thus authority), al-Qattan ap-
peared in traditional Gulf clothing (interview, December 2015). In addition – I argue 
– his critical distance was staged by having all episodes shot outdoors in different 
beautiful Lebanese nature-settings. 
 
Al-Qattan discussed general themes of religious or moral questions in the first epi-
sodes; by the ninth episode “The Zionists and Daesh”12 (broadcast on 26/06/2015), 
however, things changed. Evening darkness and a bonfire had replaced the land-
scapes during daylight, and the rhetoric was sharpened. Al-Qattan articulated, in 
line with the visuals above, the interconnectedness between Israel and Islamic State, 
while the fire ate its way through the wood: 
 
The Zionist entity came from the diaspora. It came to prove its descent from a land, which is 
not its land. Here is the problem: the practises of the Zionist entity. It displaced the Palestin-
ian people; it destroyed houses, mosques, and churches; it erased the identity, any Arab iden-
tity; it erased every tree, it removed every beautiful tree, the Zionists removed every olive 
tree. […] and this is the same practice, which Daesh practises today, or al-Qaida organisation 
and the takfiri13 groups, they are all the same. Names do not matter to me. Extremist groups 
whether Zionist or Islamist, their practises are the same as are their goals, namely to extend 
the Zionist entity. The goal is the dream of the Zionist entity ‘From the Nile to the Euphrates’ 
(Harrir Aqlak, 26/06/2015). 
 
 
12 Daesh is another term for Islamic State (IS) – an Arabic acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq 
wa al-Sham and is used as an insult (Vultaggio, 2015, p. 1). I use this term when referring to al-
Qattan’s viewpoints, as he consistently uses it.  
13 Takfir means a Muslim who declares another Muslim to be apostate and therefore no longer a 
Muslim. Takfiri is the adjective and is used by some extremist groups to accuse other Muslims of 
apostasy. 
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Al-Qattan links Zionists and Islamists, their goals and strategies; they share an ex-
tremist agenda of destroying a people and a land. The focus is on the destruction of 
symbols of Arab culture and civilisation such as olive trees and religious monuments 
as illustrated in the clip, The same barbarism – the same terrorism – the same 
elimination. Thus, this is not merely about a territorial threat, but also a threat 
against Arab and Islamic identity. Al-Qattan adds: “Today, Daesh implements the 
Zionistic agenda of erasing the Islamic heritage, the Islamic identity, and the Arab 
identity with all its minorities, ethnicities and religions” (Harrir Aqlak, 
26/06/2015). Al-Qattan unfolds the enemy image later on in the same episode when 
arguing that: “Daesh is the same as al-Qaida, al-Qaida is the same as the Salafist 
Jihadist movement and the Salafist Jihadist movement is the same as Wahhabism”. 
Talking as a Gulf insider, he draws a direct line between the Islamic State and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
The editors initially doubted whether they should broadcast the episode, as they felt 
it was too strong an outburst that seemed out of context. The context arose on 23 
June 2015, when the Islamic State released a video showing a group of prisoners in 
a cage being lowered into water and drowned.14 The episode was consequently 
broadcast as a direct response to an ongoing event. A decision that was confirmed 
when the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Shi’a mosque in 
Kuwait on 26 June (interview, Beirut, December 2015). This anecdote suggests how 
the construction of an enemy image is the interplay between existing political and 
ideological positions, and developments unfolding on the ground.  
 
The escalating situation in Syria and Iraq not only provided a visible threat in the 
shape of the Islamic State, it also provided a new suitable victim, namely, the reli-
gious minorities. These religious minorities (as opposed to Sunni Muslims) played 
a central role15 since al-Mayadeen’s first day of broadcasting; but, as violence inten-
sified, they came to play the new victim lead role. Part of the construction of this 
new threat narrative, and corresponding victim and enemy image, was the integra-
tion of religious pluralism into the Othering process. Religious tolerance thus be-
came a fundamental characteristic of ‘us’, whereas ‘they’ were intolerant to a de-
monic degree.  
 
By interlinking Israel and the Islamic State, al-Mayadeen constructed a new and 
more vigorous enemy image, built on a pre-existing threat narrative, and revitalised 
by a marching actual threat. This enemy image was, furthermore, broadened and 
globalised by the general insinuation at al-Mayadeen of regional and international 
collaborations – most importantly – Israel’s well-known alliance with the United 
States, and al-Mayadeen’s outspoken suggestions that, the Islamic State being a di-
rect product of Saudi Arabian-promoted Sunni Islamism. Combined, this creates a 
 
14 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3135913/Sickening-new-ISIS-video-shows-caged-
prisoners-lowered-swimming-pool-drowned-shot-RPG-blown-explosive-filled-necklaces.html 
[accessed 16/05/20].  
15 An example is the weekly programme Ajras al-Mashreq [The Bells of the Levant], which deals with 
Christians and Christianity in the Middle East both historically and contemporary.  
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two-headed enemy image (Israel and the Islamic State) with regional allies and 
global agenda; by adding the global perspective, al-Mayadeen elevated an Arab is-
sue or an Arab enemy image to becoming yet another global phenomenon of West-
ern imperialism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Born at a time of crucial political developments in the Arab world, in a time where 
former well-established political structures were up for revision, al-Mayadeen of-
fers an interesting case study for understanding the processes of Othering, threat 
narration, and enemy image construction. The Arab world likewise allows us to un-
derstand how these processes take place across national borders, and how transna-
tional media outlets play a central role, not only as disseminators, but also as pro-
ducers of these narratives. 
  
Al-Mayadeen went on air in 2012 with a strong message about bringing Palestine 
back on top of the media agenda, while the rest of the Arab world directed its atten-
tion towards the political outcome of the uprisings. Imbedded in bringing back the 
collective Arab focus on Palestine, is discarding the idea about an Arab Spring that 
fundamentally changed the rules of the political game in the region. At al-Maya-
deen, the Arab uprisings are considered yet an expression of Western imperialism, 
aimed at dividing and weakening the Arab world, and diverting the attention from 
the question of Palestine. This perception of the political context forms the back-
ground for an Othering process, where ‘us’ and ‘them’ are categorised on the basis 
of an acceptance or rejection of the notion of The Arab Spring.  
 
The relaunch of Palestine as the centre of Arab politics is also a relaunch of the old 
and ultimate threat narrative in the Arab world, namely, that of Israel. However, as 
al-Mayadeen consciously aims at overwriting the mainstream victimised discourse 
of the Palestinians, and bringing back previous heroic narratives, Israel is corre-
spondingly losing its vitality as an actual threat. Developments on the ground in Iraq 
and Syria, and the rise of the Islamic State, provided a new and more acute threat. 
The old and new threat narrative is interwoven by al-Mayadeen, thus constructing 
one coherent enemy image with two faces. The Palestinians have been de-victim-
ised, while a new victim is taking form in the shape of religious minorities. Al-Ma-
yadeen’s promotion of religious tolerance becomes part of an Othering process in 
which Saudi Arabia plays the part as the ultimate ‘they’ or ‘bad’.  
 
The case of al-Mayadeen shows that, while the construction of enemy images starts 
with a process of Othering, and is based on pre-existing threat narratives within the 
collective memory of an ‘us’, it furthermore demands both the existence of an actual 
(or perceived) threat and an appropriate victim. The construction of an enemy image 
consequently takes place in a fine interplay between existing collective memories 
and ideological positions on the one hand, and current political developments on 
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the other – as illustrated by how the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq gen-
erated both the acute threat and the appropriate victim for an enemy image that 
fitted al-Mayadeen’s overall rejection of Sunni Islamism (and Saudi Arabian influ-
ence).  
 
The pre-2011 transnational media were considered by many as the facilitator of a 
shared Arab public, allowing information flow and public conversations across na-
tional borders and political contexts. The post-2011 reality, on the other hand, has 
offered a fragmented media environment of politically-based echo chambers – an 
ideal context for threat narratives and enemy images to thrive. The establishment of 
al-Mayadeen and its following production of enemy images must be understood 
within this unfortunate trend of fragmentation. This is even more disturbing, as this 
critical time in the Arab world of continued military conflict and authoritarian con-
solidation, calls for a pluralistic media environment that offers genuine and con-
structive conversations about contemporary challenges and future aspirations. 
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